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Abstract
This paper studies rigidities in sharing joint payoﬀs (non-trans-
ferability) as a source of excessive segregation in labor or education
markets. The resulting distortions in ex-ante investments, such as ed-
ucation acquisition, link such mismatches to the possibility of simul-
taneous under-investment by the underprivileged and over-investment
by the privileged. This creates an economic rationale for rematch
policies like aﬃrmative action, which have to be evaluated in terms of
both incentives and the assignment quality. We compare a number of
such policies that have empirical counterparts. Our results indicate
that some of these policies can be beneﬁcial on both equity and eﬃ-
ciency grounds.
Keywords: Matching, nontransferable utility, multidimensional at-
tributes, aﬃrmative action, segregation, education.
JEL: C78, I28, J78.
1 Introduction
Some of the most important economic decisions we make – where to live,
which profession to enter, whom to marry – depend for their consequences not
only on our own characteristics or “types” (wealth, skill, or temperament),
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but also on those of the people with whom we live or work. These decisions
matter not only in a static sense, for our own well-being or those of our
partners, but also dynamically: the prospect of being able to select particular
kinds of neighbors, associates or mates, or the environment those partners
provide, aﬀects the costs and beneﬁts of investment. The impact of those
investments may extend far beyond our immediate partners to the economy
as a whole.
A natural question – one in which policy makers in rich and poor coun-
tries have taken a direct interest – is whether the market outcome of our
“matching” decisions leads to outcomes that are socially desirable. Indeed,
it has often been contended in public policy debates in the U.S., U.K., India
and elsewhere that the market has failed to sort people desirably: there is too
much segregation, whether by educational attainment, ethnic background or
caste. Certain groups appear to be excluded from normal participation in
economic life, and that in turn depresses their willingness to invest in human
capital. If the market does “mismatch” people in this way, policy remedies
might include “rematching” individuals into other partnerships via aﬃrma-
tive action, school integration or corporate diversity policies.
Much discussion about policies aimed at correcting mismatch tends to
rely on motivations like equity, social cohesion or righting past wrongs, with
an acknowledgement that there may be a cost in aggregate performance:
the classic equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ. One reason for this focus may be that
economic theory shows that some form of imperfection needs to be present if
a policy intervention is to generate performance gains.1 It remains an open
question, however, whether policies that directly constrain matches between
agents necessarily conﬂict with eﬃciency when there are imperfections.
This paper will be concerned with one important but understudied im-
perfection: rigidities in the distribution of surplus among matched partners.
Though it is well-known that such “non-transferability” can distort matching
patterns relative to the no-rigidity case, there has been little work characteriz-
1If the characteristics of matched partners (ability, gender, or race) are exogenous, then
under the assumptions that (1) partners can make non-distortionary side payments to each
other (transferable utility or TU); (2) there is symmetric information about characteristics;
and (3) there are no widespread externalities, stable matching outcomes are social surplus
maximizing: no other assignment of individuals can raise the economy’s aggregate payoﬀ.
Even if characteristics (such as income or skill) are endogenous, the result of investments
made either before matching or within matches, under the above assumptions, re-matching
the market outcome is unlikely to be desirable (Cole et al., 2001; Felli and Roberts, 2002).3
ing those patterns, much less their implications for investment. Our analysis
will show speciﬁcally that the market may deliver more segregation than it
would without rigid surplus sharing, and will link that outcome to the pos-
sibility of simultaneous over-investment at the top and under-investment at
the bottom (OTUB): underprivileged individuals invest less than they would
in an otherwise identical economy without rigidities, while privileged ones
invest more. This creates an economic rationale for policies that “rematch”
individuals into new partnerships (called “associational redistribution” in
Durlauf, 1996a). Evaluating such policies must take account of incentives as
well as the quality of assignment. We ﬁnd that properly designed rematch
policies may raise both raise social surplus and ameliorate inequality.
Rigidity in sharing surplus within ﬁrms, schools, or neighborhoods can
arise for numerous reasons. Among them are moral hazard, contractual in-
completeness, liquidity constraints, limited commitment, non-contractibility
of returns, legal constraints and regulation, or “behavioral” sources such as
envy, inequity aversion, or repugnance. Some or all of these problems arise in
professional ﬁrms with proﬁt sharing arrangements, but are endemic to most
ﬁrms. Rigidities are likely all the more pertinent if the matches represent
educational institutions, since when part of the payoﬀ to matching is inalien-
able, such as training or reputation, transferring gains across individuals may
become very costly. Technically, these rigidities generate non-transferable
utility (NTU) in the feasible set of payoﬀ possibilities for matched partners.2
Economists are well aware, at least since Becker (1973), that under NTU,
the equilibrium matching pattern will diﬀer from the one under TU, and
need not maximize aggregate social surplus (see also Legros and Newman,
2007). This is because a type that receives a large share of the pie generated
in an (eﬃcient) match under TU may be forced to accept a smaller share due
to rigidities in dividing that pie if she stays with the same type of partner
under NTU. She may then prefer to match with another type with whom
she can obtain higher payoﬀs. If individuals’ preferences over matches agree
2Note that it is the inability to make non-contingent side payments at the time of
matching, not the fact that payoﬀs may be pecuniary, that is at issue. For instance, if
revenue is non-contractible when partnerships form, and will be determined down the
road via some bargaining procedure, then from the point of view of match formation,
the feasible set is a single point, corresponding to the vector of bargained wages each
partner will eventually receive; this is the ultimate in non-transferability and can only be
oﬀset if the partners also have (large amounts of) cash at the time the partnership forms
(borrowing, even if feasible, will typically not help much, since that will tend to distort
individual eﬀorts during the course of the relationship).4
(for instance everyone prefers higher types to lower types), this may lead to
“excessive” segregation, at least from the viewpoint of ex-ante Pareto opti-
mality, i.e., maximizing welfare from behind a veil of ignorance, before people
know their types (as in Harsanyi, 1953; Holmstr¨ om and Myerson, 1983).3
Moreover, since returns to investments in attributes made before the mar-
ket depend on the anticipated matching possibilities resulting from invest-
ment, mismatch can also generate a dynamic ineﬃciency, distorting ex-ante
investments such as education acquisition. When mismatch takes the form of
excessive segregation in socio-economic background and returns to education
are complimentary to background, the distortion may be in form of OTUB,
with obvious implications for persistent inequality and socio-economic po-
larization. Though rematch policies cannot directly address the sources of
NTU, they may provide an instrument for correcting ineﬃciency of the match
as well as distortions in investment incentives, if properly designed.
Despite the importance of NTU in many parts of economics, its implica-
tions for the nature of market matches, the level and distribution of invest-
ment in such markets, and for the eﬀects of re-matching policy have received
scant attention, although the literature has looked at other potential sources
of mismatch like incorrect beliefs and search frictions. In addition to the gap
in theoretical understanding, the case of NTU as a fundamental driver of
mismatch appears to be consistent with empirical observations: the removal
of aﬃrmative action policies that have been in place for a while often results
in reversion to the pre-policy status quo, for instance in case of the end of
high school desegregation.4 NTU also provides a natural explanation for po-
litical opposition to aﬃrmative action policies: it is diﬃcult to compensate
the unfavored group; otherwise the market would have already done so.
The setup we employ to analyze various forms of rematch is as follows.
Agents have a binary background type reﬂecting whether they are privileged
3Aﬃrmative action policies typically do not yield ex-post Pareto improvements unless
accompanied by compensation, i.e., monetary transfers, which are, by nature, severely
limited in a nontransferable utility framework. Nevertheless we will evaluate allocations
in terms of aggregate surplus. This is a standard approach to evaluating mechanisms
(or institutions) and may correspond, for instance, to how future parents would vote on
educational policy. Equally important, the link between the design of rematch policies
and aggregate performance measures such as GDP is of interest from a positive viewpoint.
4Orﬁeld and Eaton (1996) report evidence of increased segregation in the South of
the U.S. in districts where court-ordered high school desegregation ended, see also
Clotfelter et al. (2006) and Lutz (2011). Weinstein (2011) ﬁnds increased residential seg-
regation as a consequence of the mandated desegregation.5
or not. Privilege confers a productivity beneﬁt, in terms of (increased) mar-
ket output, for instance due to superior access to resources. Agents can aﬀect
their labor market productivity (also a binary variable) by investing in ed-
ucation, which determines the probability of attaining a high achievement.5
In the labor market, when achievements have been realized, agents match
into ﬁrms whose output depends on both the members’ achievements and
their backgrounds (thus we are dealing with a multi-dimensional assignment
problem). The production technology is such that some diversity (hetero-
geneity) within ﬁrms is more productive, and would be the outcome under
unrestricted side payments. We model NTU in the simplest possible way:
output is shared equally within ﬁrms.
Under non-transferability, the labor market segregates in educational
achievement and background. This means the laissez-faire equilibrium out-
come is ineﬃcient from an aggregate surplus perspective. When agents’ types
enter the production function directly, individual returns from education in-
vestment depend positively on the productivity of the match in the labor
market. This is the source of the OTUB result: the underprivileged ﬁnd
investing to be too costly or unremunerative, while the privileged receive
ineﬃciently high rewards in the labor market.
Rematch policies that aﬀect the labor market match can thus be used
to inﬂuence investment behavior, as well as having a direct eﬀect on assign-
ment quality. Indeed an often-voiced concern about rematch policies is that
they may harm the investment incentives of the group favored by the pol-
icy by guaranteeing its members minimal payoﬀs and that they may reduce
the incentives of unfavored groups, whose members may obtain rents under
laissez-faire. When there is over-investment by the privileged, at least the
latter eﬀect may become socially desirable.
Analyzing a plausible parametric case of the model in detail we evalu-
ate two particular variants of rematch policies that are frequently used by
policymakers: aﬃrmative action, where preference is awarded to underprivi-
leged individuals when comparing individuals of the same achievement level,
and “busing”, where assignment to teams replicates the population composi-
5Stochastic investment in attributes with a continuum of agents allows the use of the
deterministic limit of the attribute distribution in the market. If the investment technology
ensures that the distribution has full support, equilibrium investments under rational
expectations are unique. This is quite convenient, since such settings are often plagued by
problems of multiple equilibria (see Cole et al., 2001).6
tion in expectation, ignoring achievement. While both policies may generate
higher aggregate surplus than laissez-faire, aﬃrmative action always domi-
nates busing in terms of aggregate surplus, investment, and income. Since
both policies improve the sorting to a similar extent, this is mainly due to
diﬀerential investment incentives under the two policies: under aﬃrmative ac-
tion encouragement of the underprivileged outweighs discouragement of the
privileged, resulting in higher aggregate investment than both laissez-faire
and the ﬁrst best. The opposite holds for busing: guaranteeing low achievers
a high achieving match with positive probability provides implicit insurance
against low achievements, depressing incentives for education acquisition con-
siderably. For the same reason policies that ignore background, but rematch
individuals based on achievements are always dominated by laissez-faire or
aﬃrmative action in our setting, where some diversity in backgrounds is de-
sirable. If one is primarily concerned with decreasing inequality, both of
education investments and income, a busing policy dominates aﬃrmative ac-
tion, laissez-faire, and the ﬁrst best if the underprivileged are a majority, and
aﬃrmative action dominates if the underprivileged are a minority.
Literature
The literature on school and neighborhood choice (see among others B´ enabou,
1993, 1996; Epple and Romano, 1998) typically ﬁnds too much segregation
in types. This may be due to market power (see, e.g., Board, 2009) or
widespread externalities (see also Durlauf, 1996b; Fern´ andez and Rogerson,
2001). When attributes are ﬁxed, aggregate surplus may be raised by an ad-
equate policy of bribing some individuals to migrate (see also de Bartolome,
1990). Fern´ andez and Gal´ ı (1999) compare matching market allocations of
school choice with those generated by tournaments: the latter may domi-
nate in terms of aggregate surplus when capital market imperfections lead
to non-transferability. They do not consider investments before the match.
Peters and Siow (2002) and Booth and Coles (2010) present models where
agents invest in attributes before matching in a marriage market under strict
NTU. The former ﬁnds that allocations are constrained Pareto optimal (with
the production technology they study, aggregate surplus is also maximized),
and does not discuss policy. The latter compares diﬀerent marriage insti-
tutions in terms of their impact on matching and investments. Gall et al.
(2006) analyzes the impact of timing of investment on allocative eﬃciency.7
Several recent studies consider investments before matching under asymmet-
ric information (see e.g., Bidner, 2008; Hopkins, 2012; Hoppe et al., 2009),
mainly focusing on wasteful signaling, while not considering rematch policies.
Rematch has been supported on eﬃciency grounds in the case where there
is a problem of statistical discrimination: Coate and Loury (1993) provides
one formalization of the argument that equilibria where under-investment is
supported by “wrong” expectations may be eliminated by aﬃrmative action
policies (an “encouragement eﬀect”), but importantly also points out a pos-
sible downside (“stigma eﬀect”). Other imperfections, such as rationing the
number of jobs available (Fryer and Loury, 2007), may also give an eﬃciency
rationale for aﬃrmative action or education subsidies. A related literature
discusses the possibility that aﬃrmative action may lead to mismatch in
the sense that the beneﬁciaries of the policy end up being worse oﬀ than in
the market outcome as admitting them to better schools may lower their ex-
pected grades and economic outcomes (Sander, 2004; Fryer and Loury, 2005;
Arcidiacono et al., 2011). These studies focus on the static eﬀects; issues of
investment and dynamic incentives are not discussed. Finally, on comparing
diﬀerent rematch policies, Fryer et al. (2008) ﬁnds that a color blind policy
(in our framework equivalent to an achievement based policy) sometimes is
more desirable than a color sighted (our aﬃrmative action and busing poli-
cies) in a world where agents have a binary choice for education. This ﬁnding
is opposite to ours; a crucial diﬀerence to our study is the absence of mis-
match in the labor market, illustrating why the consideration of NTU can
be informative for the policy discussion.
The emphasis here is on characterizing stable matches and contrast-
ing them with ones imposed by policy. Thus we shall not be concerned
with the market outcome under search frictions (Shimer and Smith, 2000;
Smith, 2006), nor with mechanisms employed to achieve either stable matches
or ones with desirable welfare properties (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
Matching policies in this paper might, of course, use such mechanisms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model framework;
ﬁrst best and laissez-faire allocations are derived in Section 3. Section 4
compares them to policies of aﬃrmative action. Section 5 provides some
extensions, while Section 6 concludes. All proofs and calculations not in the
text can be found in the appendix.8
2 Model
The market is populated by a continuum of agents with unit measure. Though
we refer to it as a “labor market,” it can also be interpreted in other ways,
for instance as a market for places in university. Agents may diﬀer in their
educational achievement a ∈ {h,ℓ} (for high and low) and their background
b ∈ {p,u} (for privileged and underprivileged). While individual background
is given exogenously, achievement is a consequence of individual investments
taken before the market. Achieving h with probability e requires an invest-
ment in education of e at individual cost e2/2.
In the market an agent is fully characterized by an attribute, a pair ab.
Matching into a ﬁrm (ab,a′b′), two agents with attributes ab and a′b′ generate
surplus z(ab,a′b′) separable in achievements and background:
z(ab,a
′b
′) = f(a,a
′)g(b,b
′) (1)
where, f(h,h) = 2, f(h,ℓ) = f(ℓ,h) = 1, f(ℓ,ℓ) = 0, (2)
g(p,p) = 1, g(p,u) = g(u,p) = δ, g(u,u) = δ/2, (3)
with δ > 1/2. Note that the “production” function f(.) has constant returns
to achievement: f(a,h) − f(a,ℓ) = 1 for any a.6 Therefore the matching
pattern is driven entirely by background eﬀects: if, for instance, g(b,b′) = 1
for all b,b′, z(ab,a′b′) = f(a,a′), and all matching patterns yield the same
aggregate surplus.
The condition δ > 1/2 implies that agents with attribute hu are more
productive than those with ℓp; this assumption is for convenience and guar-
antees a complete order on attributes ab, in the sense that for any attribute
ab, if a′b′ > a′′b′′ then z(ab,a′b′) > z(ab,a′′b′′):
ℓu < ℓp < hu < hp. (4)
The “peer group eﬀect” function g(b,b′) has strictly decreasing diﬀerences
(that is, 2g(p,u) > g(p,p)+g(u,u)) if, and only if, δ > 2/3. The assumption
that g(u,u) = g(p,u)/2 is only for convenience; as long as g(u,u) ≥ g(p,u)/2
6Our framework is compatible with more general surplus functions of the form
(a + a′)α(b + b′)β with α ≥ 1 and β ≤ 1. As long as the privileged agents’ advantage
is great enough, p/u > 21+(α−1)/β − 1, both NTU and TU equilibrium matching pat-
terns remain unchanged, though incentives and therefore policy eﬀects change, but the
qualitative results carry over. Computations would be more cumbersome, however.9
the matching patterns under NTU and TU remain the same; see Section 5.
This simpliﬁcation allows us to focus on a tradeoﬀ between two key param-
eters: the measure of the privileged π and the labor market disadvantage
of the underprivileged δ, capturing for instance the diﬃculty of generating
high return from a given output in the market (in form of access to ﬁnancial
markets, business and social networks).
2.1 Timing
The timing in the model economy is as follows.
1. Policies, if any, are put in place.
2. Agents of background b choose investment eb. Given an investment e
the probability of achievement h is e and of achievement ℓ is 1 − e.
3. Achievement is realized and is publicly observed.
4. Agents form groups of size two in a matching market with no search
frictions, though it may be constrained by policies.
5. Once groups are formed, output is realized and is shared between the
agents.
2.2 Equilibrium
The matching market outcome (absent a policy intervention) is determined
by a stable assignment of individuals into groups of size two given attributes
ab, which are in turn determined by individuals’ optimal choice of educa-
tion acquisition e under rational expectations. A labor market equilibrium is
therefore deﬁned as a bijective matching function between individuals char-
acterized by attributes ab, and a share of output for each agent within a
group such that:
• (Payoﬀ Feasibility) Within a group (i,j), the sum of the shares at most
exhausts the total output z(aibi,ajbj).
• (Stability) There do not exist two individuals who can be strictly better
oﬀ by matching and choosing a feasible share of output given their
equilibrium payoﬀ.10
Existence of such an equilibrium is standard, see, e.g., Kaneko and Wooders
(1986). That is, a labor market equilibrium determines individual payoﬀs
depending on attribute ab. Equilibrium payoﬀs will generally depend on the
distribution of attributes, which is determined by education choices and the
initial distribution of backgrounds. An investment equilibrium is deﬁned as
individual education choices {ei} such that
• (Individual Optimality) Every agent i’s education choice ei maximizes
i’s utility from the expected labor market equilibrium payoﬀs consistent
with {ei}.
The fact that attributes in the labor market are determined by stochastic
achievements of a continuum of agents simpliﬁes matters. Let individuals be
indexed such that individual i is i ∈ [0,1], which is endowed with Lebesgue
measure. W.l.o.g. assume that all agents i ∈ [0,π) have background p and
all agents in i ∈ (π,1] have background u. If the investment level of agents
with background b is eb, then, by a law of large numbers, the measures of the
diﬀerent attributes ℓu, ℓp, hu, and hp are respectively (1−π)(1−eu), π(1−ep),
(1 − π)eu, and πep. Hence, given education choices eb the distribution of
attributes in the labor market is deterministic.
This implies that labor market equilibrium payoﬀs only depend on aggre-
gates eu and ep. Therefore in any investment equilibrium all u individuals
face the same optimization problem, and all p individuals face the same opti-
mization problem. Hence, in all pure strategy investment equilibria all agents
of the same background b choose the same education investment eb.
Our analysis will describe the matching patterns in terms of attributes;
because there may be ‘unbalanced’ measures of diﬀerent attributes, the equi-
librium matches of a given attribute may specify diﬀerent attributes. For in-
stance, matches (hp,hu) and (hp,ℓu) may be part of an equilibrium. This can
be consistent with our deﬁnition of equilibrium matches only if the matches
between attributes are measure-preserving.
2.3 Degree of Transferability
We will consider two extreme cases. As a benchmark, we use the equilibrium
allocation with perfect transferability; in this allocation investment choices
and the equilibrium match maximize total surplus, as we will show.11
Our main focus, however, is on laissez-faire and policy outcomes under
non-transferability. To facilitate exposition we assume strictly nontransfer-
able utility, so that only a single vector of payoﬀs is feasible in any ﬁrm: each
partner obtains exactly half the output. Equal sharing under strict NTU is
for convenience; what matters qualitatively is that every type would prefer to
be matched with higher rather than lower types. Strict NTU can also be re-
laxed. All results in the paper are robust to allowing for some transferability
by admitting for either a suﬃciently small range of perfect transferability, or
for suﬃcient curvature in the Pareto frontier within matched partnerships.7
3 Laissez-Faire, Mismatch and Incentives
To start our analysis we will characterize the equilibria under full transfer-
ability and laissez-faire (NTU), including the eﬀects of each regime on the
choice of investment by u and p agents.
3.1 Full Transferability
When there is full transferability within matches the Pareto frontier for
a match (ab,a′b′) is obtained by sharing rules in the set {s : w(ab) =
s,w(a′b′) = z(ab,a′b′) − s}. It is well known that under full transferabil-
ity agents with the same attribute must obtain the same payoﬀ.8 Because
of equal treatment there is no loss of generality in deﬁning the equilibrium
payoﬀ of an attribute, denoted by w(ab).
We now characterize the equilibrium. The structure of payoﬀs and the
stability conditions lead to the following observations.
Fact 1. (i) (hp,ℓu) matches cannot be part of a ﬁrst best allocation.
(ii) Conditional on agents of a given background matching together, segre-
gation in achievement maximizes aggregate surplus.
7Strict NTU, even with monetary payoﬀs, can be obtained in various ways, e.g. as
the outcome of ex-post bargaining, as already mentioned, or as the limiting outcome of
a standard moral-hazard-in-teams model where the partners’ unobservable eﬀorts become
perfect complements.
8Otherwise, if one agent obtains strictly less than another this violates stability, since
the payoﬀ diﬀerence could be shared between the ﬁrst agent and the partner of the second
agent.12
(iii) Conditional on high achievement agents matching together, segregation
by background is surplus eﬃcient if, and only if, δ < 2/3.
(iv) A ﬁrst best allocation exhausts all possible (hu,ℓp) matches.
The ﬁrst statement follows because in a (hp,ℓu) ﬁrm hp agents lose more
compared to their segregation payoﬀ than ℓu agents gain. (ii) holds when-
ever f(a,a′) has weakly increasing returns. For (iii) recall that δ < 2/3
implies that g(b,b′) has strictly increasing diﬀerences. Therefore having a
privileged partner is more valuable to a privileged than to an underprivi-
leged agent. Observation (iv) is perhaps a little surprising: even when both
f(a,a′) and g(b,b′) have increasing diﬀerences, which tends to favor segrega-
tion, some integration of hu and ℓp is eﬃcient.9 The reason for this is that
aggregates of achievement f(a,a′) and background g(b,b′) in a team are com-
plements. When matching a privileged low achiever and an underprivileged
high achiever, who were previously segregated, the increase in surplus z(.)
due to peer eﬀects g(.) is suﬃcient to oﬀset the possible loss of surplus due
to the change of inputs to production f(.):
f(h,ℓ)[g(u,p) − g(u,u)] − f(h,ℓ)[g(p,p) − g(u,p)]
> −[f(h,ℓ) − f(ℓ,ℓ)]g(p,p) + [f(h,h) − f(h,ℓ)]g(u,u).
Figure 1 summarizes these observations and shows the possible equilibrium
matching patterns under full transferability. Dotted arrows indicate matches
subject to availability of agents after exhausting matches denoted by solid
arrows.
GFED @ABC ℓu
ww
￿￿
GFED @ABC ℓp ((
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
GFED @ABC hu
xx
￿￿
GFED @ABC hp xx
￿￿
GFED @ABC ℓu
ww
￿￿
GFED @ABC ℓp ((
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
GFED @ABC hu
￿￿ ￿￿
GFED @ABC hp xx
￿￿
Figure 1: TU equilibrium matchings for δ < 2
3 (top) and δ > 2
3 (bottom).
9This extends to cases when both f(a,a′) and g(b,b′) have strictly increasing diﬀer-
ences. Hence, the condition to have segregation as the surplus maximizing allocation, i.e.,
supermodularity of the surplus function z(ab,a′b′), is substantially more demanding in a
world with multidimensional attributes than in a one-dimensional world.13
3.2 TU Wages
There are some reasons to suspect that diversity in backgrounds is indeed
desirable (i.e., δ > 2/3). For instance, when the privileged have prefer-
ential access to resources, distribution channels, or information, the ben-
eﬁt of a privileged background will diminish in the number of privileged
agents already on the team. Furthermore, teams that are heterogeneous in
backgrounds are able to cater to customers of diﬀerent socioeconomic char-
acteristics, for instance through language skills and knowledge of cultural
norms. Finally, when teams perform problem-solving tasks, groups with di-
verse backgrounds tend to perform well, because members diﬀer in their use
of heuristics (Hong and Page, 2001). We assume that possible drawbacks of
background diversity (for instance in form of transaction cost) in a team is
outweighed by the beneﬁts of higher potential revenue.
Suppose therefore that δ > 2/3 (though we examine the case δ ∈ (1/2,2/3)
in the Appendix). Under TU all possible (hu,ℓp) matches are exhausted, then
all remaining (hp,hu) matches. All remaining attributes segregate. There-
fore w(ℓu) = 0. Wages for other attributes will depend on relative scarcity,
which in turn will depend on initial measure of privileged π and achievable
surplus z(ab,a′b′). The following statement summarizes the properties of TU
equilibrium investment levels.
Fact 2. Suppose δ > 2/3. Under full TU investment levels ep and eu increase
in π. δ ≤ ep < 1 for π < 1 and ep = 1 for π = 1. δ/2 ≤ eu < δ for π < 1 and
eu = δ for π = 1.
That is, investment in education increases in the measure of privileged.
This is because for the underprivileged the payoﬀ of hu agents determines eu
as w(ℓu) = 0 and increases in the measure of available privileged matches,
and approaches δ as ℓp agents become abundant. The payoﬀ of hp agents
increases in the measure of surplus hp agents that will segregate, while the
payoﬀ of ℓp agents decreases as the measure of hu agents decreases in π.
If one thinks of the ﬁrst best outcome as the matching pattern that maxi-
mizes total output, the following lemma states that the equilibrium of the TU
environment indeed leads to a ﬁrst best allocation. The proof proceeds by
showing that the TU wages w(ab) coincide with the social marginal beneﬁt
of investment by an individual of background b.
Lemma 1. The equilibria of the TU environment lead to ﬁrst best allocations:14
matching is surplus eﬃcient given the realized attributes, and investment
levels maximize ex-ante total surplus net of investment costs.
3.3 NTU Market Equilibrium
Recall that in the laissez-faire environment agents split the surplus, each get-
ting z(ab,a′b′)/2; the Pareto frontier for a match (ab,a′b′) consists therefore
of a single point.
The laissez-faire equilibrium allocation under strictly nontransferable util-
ity has full segregation in attributes. This is because monotonicity of the
function z( ) implies that max{z(ab,ab),z(a′b′,a′b′)} > z(ab,a′b′). This in
turn makes it impossible to have a positive measure of (ab,a′b′) ﬁrms, with
ab  = a′b′, in equilibrium because this would violate stability. Equilibrium
payoﬀs are therefore:
w(hp) = 1,w(ℓp) = 0,w(hu) = δ/2,w(ℓu) = 0.
Corresponding investment levels are:
e
∗
p = 1 and e
∗
u = δ/2.
A comparison of laissez-faire market equilibrium investment levels e∗
b and the
ﬁrst best ones derived in Fact 2, visualized in Figure 2, yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 (OTUB). The privileged over-invest for π < 1. The under-
privileged never over-invest and under-invest if π > δ
2+δ, in which case there
is both over-investment at the top and under-investment at the bottom of the
background distribution.
The presence of simultaneous under-investment by the underprivileged
and over-investment by the privileged is implied by two properties of the
surplus function. First, diversity in backgrounds is beneﬁcial holding con-
stant the composition of achievements (this is implied by δ > 2/3). The
second property is complementarity of diversity and returns to investments
(implied by separability of achievement and background in z(.) and the fact
that g(u,p) > g(u,u)).10 Both properties guarantee that there will be over-
investment at the top and under-investment at the bottom for π high enough.
10Desirability of background diversity is not a necessary condition for OTUB in general.15
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Figure 2: Education investments under laissez-faire and TU.
This observation extends to more general settings (details are available from
the authors).
This result is interesting for several reasons. First, it states that excessive
segregation as a consequence of market frictions may discourage the under-
privileged, an eﬀect that is often quoted as a rationale for rematch policies.
Moreover, excessive segregation may encourage the privileged to invest be-
yond eﬃcient levels. This would suggest that the discouragement eﬀect that
such policies arguably have on those not favored, i.e., the privileged, could
be desirable from a total surplus point of view.
Second, the result connects well to empirical ﬁndings. Interpreting back-
ground as race, a black-white test score gap already in place at early ages
(Heckman, 2008) would be ampliﬁed by background segregation. Recent ev-
idence for this is provided in Card and Rothstein (2007) and Hanushek et al.
(2009). Interpreting background as gender, with females as underprivileged,
links gender segregation in the workplace to female under- and male over-
investment in education. (If females have a cost advantage in investment,
then once the workplace is integrated, be it by policy or social change, females
may have higher investment than males, as appears to be the case currently
in the U.S.; see Section 5.) And if privileged background corresponds to pref-
For instance, OTUB occurs in this setting also when 1/2 < δ < 2/3, for π ∈ (1/2,1). It is
necessary, however, that some background integration occurs in the benchmark allocation.16
erential access to resources and markets, the pattern of investments appears
similar to the observation in Banerjee and Munshi (2004): outsiders and in-
siders segregate, and the empirical evidence is consistent with under-invest
by the former and over-investment by the latter.
Third, excessive segregation also has implications for inequality. Com-
puting variance as a measure of inequality yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Education investments eb are distributed more unequally in the
laissez-faire outcome than in the ﬁrst best. The distribution of income w(ab)
is more unequal for intermediate π (close to 1/2) in the laissez-faire outcome
than in the ﬁrst best.
Hence, if backgrounds are distributed relatively equally, excessive seg-
regation is accompanied by excessive income inequality. In other instances
however, income inequality may be greater in the ﬁrst best benchmark as
scarce attributes are paid their full market price (for instance when π is close
to 0, hp agents obtain 3δ/2 in the ﬁrst best, but only 1 under laissez-faire).
If education investment is linked to social mobility, the type of invest-
ment distortion described in Proposition 1 suggests that social mobility in the
laissez-faire outcome is ineﬃciently low, which may foster the development
of an entrenched privileged elite. Moreover, under-investment at the bottom
combined with over-investment at the top is likely to increase socio-economic
inequality and polarization, with the possibility that politico-economic prob-
lems of excessive segregation are exacerbated.
4 Policies
Mismatch and investment distortions in the laissez-faire allocation may gen-
erate a role for rematch policies, that is, policies that constrain some match-
ing patterns by imposing conditions on the partners’ attributes. In particu-
lar, we will examine in detail two frequently used policies: aﬃrmative action,
which gives precedence to minority candidates only if they are equal in all
other characteristics, and background integration (“busing”) in which prece-
dence is given to minority candidates unconditional on other characteristics,
for instance with an aim to match background composition of teams to the
population measures.17
4.1 Aﬃrmative Action Policy
Aﬃrmative action is deﬁned as priority given to underprivileged background
agents for positions at a given level of achievement.
Deﬁnition 1. Consider an equilibrium and a match (ap,a′b). An aﬃrmative
action policy (denoted A policy) requires that an agent with attribute au
must not strictly prefer to join a′b to staying in his current assignment.
For instance, if there is a match (hp,ℓp), then it must be the case that
an agent hu does not strictly prefer to be in a match (hu,ℓp) and that an
agent ℓu does not prefer to be in a match (hp,ℓu). That is, this rule gives
precedence for an underprivileged candidate over a privileged competitor of
the same achievement level. It is widely used (for instance the “positive
equality bill” in the U.K., Gleichstellung in the German public service, or
reservation of places for highly qualiﬁed minority students at the grandes
´ ecoles in France).
Note that some matching patterns will violate an A policy even if they
are stable in the absence of this policy under nontransferable utility. For
instance, consider a situation where attributes segregate, which is the equi-
librium outcome under laissez-faire. Any match (hp,hp) clearly violates the
policy, since a hu agent strictly gains by joining a hp agent, who strictly
loses.
Lemma 2. Under an A policy, low achievers do not match with high achiev-
ers, and all (hp,hu) matches are exhausted, that is the measure of such in-
tegrated matches is min{(1 − π)eu,πep}.
Proof. While hp agents would prefer to segregate, since hu agents strictly
prefer to match with a hp agent than with any other agent, (hp,hp) can arise
only if there are no hu agents who are not matched with hp agents. Hence, all
(hp,hu) matches must be formed, and there is a measure min{(1 − π)eu,πep}
of such matches. The other high achievers segregate. There is indeterminacy
for the matches of the low achievers, since any match between them give a
zero output.
The equilibrium matching pattern under an A policy is shown in Figure
3. Investment levels under an A policy depend on payoﬀs, which in turn
depend on the likelihood an agent will be assigned to each attribute, that
is, on relative scarcity of attributes in the market. The following statement18
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Figure 3: Equilibrium matching under an A policy.
sums up the properties of investments under an A policy; details are in the
appendix:
Fact 3. Under an A policy πeA
p > (1 − π)eA
u if and only if π > 1/2, eA
p and
eA
u increase in π and are given by
(i) eA
p = δ and eA
u =
δ
4(1 +
p
1 + 8
π
1−π) if π < 1/2,
(ii) eA
u = eA
p = δ if π = 1/2,
(iii) eA
p = 1
2(1 +
q
1 − 41−π
π δ(1 − δ)) and eA
u = δ otherwise.
eT
p ≤ eA
p < e∗
p and e∗
u ≤ eT
u < eA
u for π ∈ (0,1).
That is, an A policy encourages the underprivileged and discourages the
privileged compared to the laissez-faire outcome. Interestingly encourage-
ment for the underprivileged is strong enough to generate investment beyond
the ﬁrst best levels, i.e., there is overshooting for the underprivileged. In con-
trast, privileged agents’ investment levels are lower than under laissez-faire
but still exceed the ﬁrst best benchmark. Figure 4 compares investment
levels under an A policy to both laissez-faire and benchmark levels. Total
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Figure 4: Education investments in the diﬀerent regimes.19
surplus can be expressed as:
S = π
(ep)2
2
+ πw(ℓp) + (1 − π)
(eu)2
2
+ (1 − π)w(ℓu),
where w(ab) denotes payoﬀs and eb is the equilibrium investment. Since
an A policy does not aﬀect low achievers’ outcomes relative to laissez-faire,
wA(ℓb) = w∗(ℓb), where we use the superscript A for an A policy and a star
for laissez-faire. Therefore SA > S∗ if, and only if:
π
(eA
p )2 − (e∗
p)2
2
+ (1 − π)
(eA
u)2 − (e∗
u)2
2
> 0.
The left hand side can be decomposed into a static eﬀect of correcting mis-
match and a dynamic eﬀect on investment incentives:
πe
∗
pw
A(hp) + (1 − π)e
∗
uw
A(hu) − [πe
∗
pw
∗(hp) + (1 − π)e
∗
uw
∗(hu)]
| {z }
static output change by rematch given by payoﬀ diﬀerences
+ π(e
A
p − e
∗
p)w
A(hp)
| {z }
discouragement eﬀect
+(1 − π)(e
A
u − e
∗
u)w
A(hu)
| {z }
encouragement eﬀect
−
π[(eA
p )2 − (e∗
p)2] + (1 − π)[(eA
u)2 − (e∗
u)2]
2 | {z }
investment cost change
> 0,
While the static eﬀect is always positive, the sign of the dynamic eﬀect
depends on the relative investment distortions under the two regimes. In
aggregate, for an A policy to generate higher surplus than laissez-faire the
encouragement eﬀect on the underprivileged has to outweigh the discour-
agement eﬀect on the privileged. The following proposition shows that this
trade-oﬀ is linked to the diversity δ.
Proposition 2 (Aﬃrmative Action Policy). There is δ∗(π) ∈ [2/3,2/
√
7]
such that total surplus under an A policy is higher than under laissez-faire if,
and only if, δ > δ∗(π). δ∗( ) attains a unique maximum of 2/
√
7 at π = 1/2.
4.2 Background Integration
The goal of this policy is to remove segregation in backgrounds by giving
underprivileged the option to match with a randomly drawn privileged, given
the capacity constraint. This policy diﬀers from an A policy in that it gives20
priority to u agents unconditional on achievement, and does not let u agents
use information on achievement either.
Deﬁnition 2. A busing policy (denoted B policy) oﬀers any u agent assign-
ment to a p agent unconditional on achievement, using uniform rationing if
necessary.
That is, this policy is best understood as one that departs from the laissez-
faire outcome of full segregation and randomly reassigns agents to match the
population measure π of privileged. This closely mirrors policies that are
or have been used around the world. The most prominent are probably the
use of “busing” in the U.S. to achieve school integration and reservation
used in India to improve representation of schedule castes and tribes (other
examples include the Employment Equality Act in South Africa, under which
some industries such as construction and ﬁnancial introduced employment
or representation quotas, and the SAMEN law in the Netherlands, which has
been repealed in 2003, however). Independence of the assignment rule on
achievement means that both ℓ and h agents of background b have the same
chance of being matched to a h agent of background b′. The following lemma
and Figure 5 characterize the matching pattern under this policy.
Lemma 3. Under a B policy a u agent obtains an hp match with probability
ep max{π/(1 − π);1} and an ℓp match with probability (1 − ep)max{π/(1 −
π);1}. If π > 1/2 (π < 1/2) measure (2π − 1) of privileged (1 − 2π) of
underprivileged) segregate in achievements.
Proof. u agents now have the outside option to match with a random p
agent. Since hu agents prefer (hu,hu) to (hu,ℓu) matches, u agents choose
between a payoﬀ of 0 for ℓu and δ/2 for hu and random assignment to some
p agent. Expected payoﬀ from this is ep/2 for ℓu and δ/2 + epδ/2 for hu
agents. Since p are assigned randomly or segregate, an hp agent expects
higher payoﬀ than an ℓp agent, which implies ep > 0. Therefore all u agents
prefer random assignment to a p agent to their segregation payoﬀ, which
implies the statement.
Using Lemma 3 it is routine to compute the investment levels under a B
policy:
Fact 4. eu = δ/2 and ep =
1−π
π δ +
2π−1
π if π > 1/2 and ep = δ/2 otherwise.21
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Figure 5: Equilibrium matching under an B policy.
Hence, a B policy has undesirable incentive eﬀects. It does not encourage
the underprivileged to invest more than under laissez-faire, while the privi-
leged are discouraged substantially: in fact there is undershooting in that the
privileged agents invest below the eﬃcient level when π < (2−δ)/δ. Figure 6
graphically compares investment levels under a B policy to both laissez-faire
and benchmark levels.
Share of privileged agents π
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
e
b
e∗
p
1 1/2 0
0
1
δ/2
δ
eT
u
eT
p
eA
u
eA
p
e∗
u = eB
u
eB
p
Figure 6: Education investments in the diﬀerent regimes.
To examine whether these adverse incentive eﬀects may be compensated
by increased assignment quality let us turn to aggregate surplus. For π ≤ 1/2
and δ2 > 4/5 total surplus under a B policy is
S
B =
δ2
8
(1 + 4π) > π
1
2
+ (1 − π)
δ2
8
= S
∗,
Hence, if δ is suﬃciently high, a busing policy generates higher total surplus
than the laissez-faire allocation. Comparing total surplus under busing to22
total surplus under aﬃrmative action, SB > SA if
δ2
8
(1 + 4π) > πδ
2 + (1 − π)
eA
u(δ − eA
u)
2
,
with eA
u = δ/4(1 +
p
1 + 8π/(1 − π)). Calculations reveal that π > 3/4 is
necessary for this inequality to hold, a contradiction to our assumption that
π ≤ 1/2. Hence, SA > SB for π ≤ 1/2. This result extends to the case
π > 1/2, treated in the appendix, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Busing Policy). There is δB(π) ∈ [2(
√
2 − 1),2/
√
5] such
that total surplus under a busing based policy is higher than under laissez-
faire if, and only if, δ > δB(π). δB attains a maximum of 2/
√
5 for π ≤ 1/2.
Total surplus is always greater under an aﬃrmative action policy than under
a busing policy.
4.3 Discussion
To summarize, both rematch policies, aﬃrmative action and busing, increase
aggregate surplus compared to the laissez-faire outcome if diversity in teams
is suﬃciently desirable, i.e., if δ is large enough. Both polices improve the
quality of sorting, but do not replicate the ﬁrst best matching, and depress
incentives of the privileged, which is desirable from a social point of view
whenever there is over-investment at the top.
Yet A and B policies diﬀer substantially in the aggregate investment
level they induce: while an A policy encourages the underprivileged beyond
the ﬁrst best level and does not discourage the privileged below their ﬁrst
best level, a B policy does not encourage the underprivileged and tends to
discourage the privileged below their ﬁrst best level. Hence, an A policy
leads to larger aggregate investment levels than a B policy or laissez-faire;
moreover, aggregate investment under an A policy exceed the ﬁrst best level.
Because an A policy does not implement the ﬁrst best matching, aggregate
income may be higher in the ﬁrst best allocation (see Figure 7).
The diﬀerent policies also aﬀect inequality of education acquisition and
income quite diﬀerently: an A policy unambiguously reduces inequality com-
pared to laissez-faire and to the ﬁrst best benchmark, whereas a B policy
may increase it for economies with a high share of privileged, see Figures 8
and 9.23
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Figure 7: Aggregate income in the diﬀerent regimes.
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Figure 8: Inequality of education investments in the diﬀerent regimes.
Other types of rematch can be imagined and are used. One type could
condition the match on achievement, integrating low and high achievers as
much as possible. A move from the laissez-faire outcome to using such A pol-
icy would, for instance, correspond to abolishing tracking at schools, that is,
assortative sorting of pupils based on past grade achievements. Achievement
based policies tend to fare worse than background based policies in terms
of total surplus in this setting. This has to be expected since incentives to
invest are likely to be suppressed substantially by the guarantee of a good
match in case of low achievement, and the present setting does not assume
beneﬁts from integration in achievement given segregation in background.24
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Figure 9: Inequality of income in the diﬀerent regimes.
Finally, a “naive” policy that tries to replicate the ﬁrst best matching
pattern will force matching between hu and ℓp agents but will depress in-
centives of both the privileged and under-privileged; when the proportion of
underprivileged is small, such A policy leads to a smaller aggregate surplus
than under a A policy.11
5 Extensions
The setup employed is chosen for simplicity rather than generality. Never-
theless it is easy to extend the framework along diﬀerent dimensions to treat
some interesting cases. For instance, one could allow for more general peer
eﬀects and assume:
g(p,p) = 1, g(p,u) = g(u,p) = δ, g(u,u) = β,
with 1/2 < δ < 1 as before, and δ/2 ≤ β < δ. Diversity in background is
now desirable if 1 + β < 2δ.
This change aﬀects the underprivileged agents’ investments only if there
are (hu,hu) matches in equilibrium. Under laissez-faire e∗
u = β/2 and under
TU, eT
u = β/2 for π ≤ 1/(1 + β), for π > 1/(1 + β) eT
u does not change.
A similar eﬀect occurs under A and B policies: compared to above, eA
u and
11Details for this as well as other claims in this section are available upon request from
the authors.25
eB
u increase for low π < 1/2 but remain the same otherwise, resulting in an
upwards shift of the lowest horizontal in Figures 3 and 5. The qualitative
properties of the welfare comparisons remain unchanged, the threshold values
δ∗(π) depend on β, however. For instance, a suﬃcient condition for an A
policy to achieve higher surplus than laissez-faire is now δ2 > (1 + β2)/2.
5.1 Heterogenous Cost
Often background not only aﬀects gains from matching through the function
g(b,b′) but also the cost of investment itself. Assume therefore that an agent
of background b who chooses education eﬀort e incurs cost e2/θb. The inter-
esting case occurs when θp < θu ≤ 1, i.e., the under-privileged have a cost
advantage at investment, but a disadvantage at marketing that investment
compared to the privileged. In this case investments are given by
eb = θb[w(hb) − w(ℓb)],
with w(ab) denoting the market payoﬀ of an agent with attribute ab. There-
fore under laissez-faire ep = θp and eu = θuβ.
Indeed there is scope for investment distortions generated by excessive
segregation and a version of Proposition 1 holds.
Fact 5. Both ep and eu increase in π, with e∗
p ≥ eT
p and e∗
u ≤ eT
u. There is
simultaneous over-investment by the privileged and under-investment by the
underprivileged if βθu/(1 + βθu) < π < δθu/(1 − θp − δθu). e∗
p > e∗
u if, and
only if, θp > θuβ, but (eT
p − eT
u) decreases in π and eT
p > eT
u for all π ∈ [0,1]
if and only if θp > δθu.
Notice that it is possible that while the underprivileged invest less than
the privileged under laissez-faire, they invest more in the surplus eﬃcient out-
come, which is characterized by integration of underprivileged high achievers.
This can occur when the share of privileged is suﬃciently high, or when the
cost advantage compensates the underprivileged’s disadvantage in the la-
bor market. Returning to the interpretation of background as gender, this
appears consistent with the move from a segregated to a more integrated
labor market outcome over the last decades, accompanied by a reversal of
educational inequality, at least measured in years of schooling. This change
might have been brought about by policy, or by social change either amelio-
rating payoﬀ rigidities, or increasing the beneﬁts of gender diversity in the26
workplace δ, a possibility that we will explore in greater detail below.
5.2 Some Transferability
Suppose agents can transfer surplus within a ﬁrm up to some exogenous
limit L, which may be interpreted as individuals’ liquidity, for instance. If
L < min{β − δ/2;1 − δ}, there is segregation in the laissez-faire equilibrium
allocation and investments are given by e∗
p = θp and e∗
u = βθu as above.
Another plausible case arises when there is some transferability, possibly
because p agents are privileged also in terms of the ability to make transfers
within a match, possibly because of better access to credit or greater wealth.
The following proposition states the properties of the laissez-faire allocation
in such a situation, the details are in the appendix.
Proposition 4. Let Lu < 1−δ and Lp > β−δ/2. In the laissez-faire outcome
all possible (hu,ℓp) matches are exhausted, all ℓu and hp agents segregate.
Then p agents under-invest for low and intermediate π and u under-invest
for intermediate π.
Note that the same outcome occurs when all agents are subject to the
same liquidity constraint L and β − δ/2 < L < 1 − δ. The properties of the
resulting matching pattern carry a “glass ceiling” ﬂavor: the underprivileged
match with the privileged, but only in (hu,ℓp) ﬁrms, not in (hu,hp) ﬁrms.
For intermediate π this is reﬂected in wages and investments: compared to
the laissez-faire allocation with L < min{β − δ/2;1 − δ} (when the labor
market fully segregates) underprivileged high achievers earn higher wages
and choose higher education investments, though these still fall short of the
TU benchmark. Moreover, there are parameters such that for intermediate
π, eu > ep for β − δ/2 < L < 1 − δ, but eu < ep if L < β − δ/2 < 1 − δ.
That is, a change of the labor market outcome toward more integration as
a consequence of less payoﬀ rigidities or greater desirability of diversity in
the work place can be accompanied by a reversal of educational inequality.12
In particular the latter seems consistent with the changes in women’s edu-
cational achievements and labor market participation over the last three or
12An increase in L may be associated to better credit market conditions, labor market
deregulation, or better contract enforcement due to improvements in the legal system.
An increase of δ, may be attributed to a change in the disadvantage of a mixed (u,p)
partnership compared to a privileged partnership, for instance due to transaction cost, or
social stigma.27
four decades, see e.g., Goldin et al. (2006).
6 Conclusion
Excessive segregation could be construed as “discrimination”; our frame-
work provides a fresh perspective on this, since “discrimination” arises here
because of the failure of the price system — the rigidity in surplus allocation
within ﬁrms — and not because of a taste for discrimination or self-fulﬁlling
beliefs about the productive abilities associated with certain backgrounds.
By comparing two simple policies, one based on both background and
achievement and the other based simply on a priority given to underprivi-
leged, we show that these two policies may improve on the laissez-faire and
can be ranked in terms of aggregate performance. However, their ranking in
terms of inequality in achievement and earnings, is a function of the relative
proportions of privileged and under-privileged, suggesting against a one-size-
ﬁt-all approach for correcting mismatches.
Because the set of policies we examine is clearly not exhaustive, our anal-
ysis provides a lower bound on the potential beneﬁts of rematch policies.
While of interest, the question of the “optimal policy” is best left to future
research. This quest will require us, for instance, to depart from the as-
sumption that all agents beneﬁt from the policy, or it may require complex
contingencies, which will raise the issue of its practical implementation. For
these reasons we feel that our focus on policies that are actually used by
policymakers around the world provides a ﬁrst and convincing argument of
the economic beneﬁts of rematch policies when there are rigidities in surplus
division within ﬁrms. What is clear however is that the optimal policy will
not be to try to mimic the ﬁrst-best matching outcome: as we have noted
in section 4.3, this policy not only weakens incentives for all agents but may
also lead to a lower aggregate surplus than our A policy.
An important extension of the approach will be to a dynamic setting. In-
deed, while our approach assumes ﬁxed and exogenous proportions of priv-
ileged and under-privileged, these proportions may be the consequence of
historical policies that discriminated against some ethnic backgrounds. A
dynamic version of our model could provide an economic interpretation of
aﬃrmative action and positive discrimination aiming to “right past wrongs”.
For instance in such a dynamic setting the value of δ, one of the key param-28
eters of our analysis, is likely to reﬂect the degree of diversity in equilibrium
matches from previous periods.
Since, as found in section 4.3, rematch policies may induce a higher aggre-
gate level of education than laissez-faire, the price of education is also likely
to increase, generating a potential dampening eﬀect for the policy from a
static perspective. On the other hand, also aggregate income may be higher
under a rematch policy than under laissez-faire, providing higher income to
pay (or to borrow) for education. Beyond aggregate levels, the change in the
inequality in access to education or in income levels due to rematch policies
documented above may also aﬀect growth. Nevertheless the relationships
between aggregate levels, inequality of education or income, and growth are
complex, and a full analysis is best left for further research.
Finally, as we emphasized in parts of the text, δ may capture not so much
the actual production diﬀerences of diﬀerent backgrounds, but the ability of
the agents to market their output, which could be due to diﬀerences in access
to the ﬁnancial market, or to networks of established traders. For instance
“old boy network” types of phenomena may lead to a low value of δ for
women and lead not only to diﬃculties to generate integration between men
and women of a given achievement level but also to depressed incentives for
women to achieve this level. This suggests that matching policies in one
market impact on the performance of matching policies in another market,
posing the interesting question of the complementarity or substitutability of
rematch policies on sequential markets.
A Mathematical Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Fact 1
For (i)
z(hp,hp) + z(ℓu,ℓu) = 2 > 2δ = 2z(hb,ℓu),29
implying that any contract for (hp,ℓu) can be competed away by (hp,bp)
since z(ℓu,ℓu) = 0. For (ii)
z(hp,hp) + z(ℓp,ℓp) = 2 ≥ 2 = 2z(hp,ℓp) and
z(hu,hu) + z(ℓu,ℓu) = δ ≥ δ = 2z(hu,ℓu).
For (iii)
z(hp,hp) + z(hu,hu) = 2 + δ > 4δ = 2z(hp,hu)
if and only if δ < 2/3.
For (iv)
z(hu,hu) + z(ℓp,ℓp) = δ < 2δ = 2z(hu,ℓp)
implying that segregation for hu,ℓp is unstable since (hu,ℓp) matches can
oﬀer strictly higher payoﬀs to both attributes. Since hu,ℓp will not seg-
regate, let us compare now the beneﬁt of hu integrating with ℓp versus
integrating with hp. By facts (i), (ii) and (iii), it is suﬃcient to compare
the matching pattern {(hp,hp),(hu,ℓp),(ℓu,ℓu)} to the matching pattern
{(hp,hu),(ℓp,ℓu)}. In the ﬁrst pattern, equal treatment implies that hp get
y, since ℓp segregates and gets zero payoﬀ and therefore in the match (hu,ℓp),
hu gets δ. Note that 1 + δ > 2δ while (hp,hu) can share at most 2δ in the
second pattern. Since δ < 1, the second pattern cannot be stable.
Proof of Fact 2
Depending on relative scarcity of hu, ℓp, and hp agents we distinguish ﬁve
cases.
Case (1): π(1 − ep) < (1 − π)eu < π. Then some hp segregate and
w(hp) = 1, hu match with hp and ℓp and obtain w(hu) = 2δ − 1. Therefore
w(ℓp) = δ − (2δ − 1). This implies eu = (2δ − 1) and ep = δ. The condition
π(1 − ep) < (1 − π)eu < π becomes
1 − δ
(2δ − 1)
<
1 − π
π
<
1
(2δ − 1)
.
Case (2): π < (1 − π)eu. Then some hu segregate and w(hu) = δ/2.
w(hp) = 2δ −w(hu) and w(ℓp) = δ −w(hu). Therefore eu = δ/2 and ep = δ.
The condition becomes
1 − π
π
>
2
δ
.30
Case (3): π(1−ep) > (1−π)eu. Then hp segregate, so that w(hp) = y. ℓp
oversupplied, therefore w(ℓp) = 0 and w(hu) = δ. ep = 1 and eu = δ. Hence,
case (2) obtains if 0 > (1 − π)δ/π, which is a contradiction to π ∈ [0,1] and
δ > 1/2.
Case (4): π(1 − ep) = (1 − π)eu < π. Again hp segregate, so that
w(hp) = 1. w(ℓp) = δ − w(hu) and (2δ − 1) ≤ w(hu) ≤ δ. eu = w(hu) and
ep = (1 − δ) + w(hu). That is,
w(hu) = πδ and w(ℓp) = (1 − π)δ + π.
This case obtains if
0 ≤
1 − π
π
≤
1 − δ
2δ − 1
.
Case (5): π(1 − ep) < (1 − π)eu = π. Then w(ℓp) = δ − w(hu) and
w(hp) = 2δ − w(hu), and δ/2 ≤ w(hu) ≤ 2δ − 1. ep = δ and eu = w(hu) =
π/(1 − π). For this case we need
2
δ
≥
1 − π
π
≥
1
2δ − 1
.
Summarizing, ep = δ if π ≤ 2δ−1
δ and ep = 1 if π ≥ 1, and δ < ep < 1
otherwise. eu = δ
2 if π ≤ δ
2+δ, δ
2 < eu < 2δ − 1 if δ
2+δ < π < 2δ−1
2δ , eu = 2δ −1
if
(2δ−1)
2δ ≤ π ≤ 2δ−1
δ , 2δ − 1 < eu < δ if 2δ−1
δ < π < 1, and eu = δ if π ≥ 1.
TU Wages for δ < 2/3
Fact 6. If δ < 2/3 ﬁrst best investments are
(i) ep = (1 − δ/2) if
1−π
π ≥ 1, ep = 1 if
1−π
π < 0, and (1 − δ/2) < ep < 1
otherwise.
(ii) eu = δ/2 if 1−π
π ≥ 1, eu = δ if 1−π
π < 0, and δ/2 < eu < δ otherwise.
(iii) ep decreases in π and eu increases in π.
Proof. Since δ < 2/3 the ﬁrst best exhausts all (hu,ℓp) matches, all remain-
ing types segregate. Therefore:
w(hp) = 1 and w(ℓu) = 0.
Wages for other attributes depend relative scarcity. Three diﬀerent cases
may arise.31
Case (1): π(1 − ep) < (1 − π)eu. hu are oversupplied, therefore w(hu) =
δ/2 and w(ℓp) = δ/2. ep = (1 − δ/2) and eu = δ/2. Hence, case (1) if
1 − π
π
> 1.
Case (2): π(1 − ep) > (1 − π)eu. Now ℓp are oversupplied, therefore
w(ℓp) = 0 and w(hu) = δ. ep = 1 and eu = δ. Hence, case (2) obtains if
1 − π
π
< 0.
Case (3): π(1 − ep) = (1 − π)eu. Then w(ℓp) = δ − w(hu) and δ/2 ≤
w(hu) ≤ δ. eu = w(hu) and ep = (1 − δ) + w(hu). That is,
w(hu) = πδ and w(ℓp) = (1 − π)δ.
This case obtains if
0 ≤
1 − π
π
≤ 1.
These cases establish the statement above.
Proof of Lemma 1
To establish static surplus eﬃciency suppose the contrary, i.e. there are agents
with equilibrium payoﬀs w(ab)+w(a′b′) < z(ab,a′b′). Then there are feasible
wages w′(ab) + w′(a′b′) = z(ab,a′b′), which both strictly prefer to their equi-
librium payoﬀ, a contradiction to stability. Therefore matching is surplus
eﬃcient given investments.
The second part of the lemma on eﬃciency of investments requires some
work. Let {ab} denote a distribution of attributes in the economy, and
 (ab,a′b′) the measure of (ab,a′b′) ﬁrms in a surplus eﬃcient match given
{ab}. Since  (ab,a′b′) only depends on aggregates πep, π(1 − ep), (1 − π)eu,
and (1 − π)(1 − eu) and investment cost is strictly convex, in an allocation
maximizing total surplus all p agents invest the same level ep, and all u agent
invest eu.
An investment proﬁle (eu,ep) and the associated surplus eﬃcient match
 (.) maximize total surplus ex ante if there is no (e′
u,e′
p) and an associated
surplus eﬃcient match  (.) such that total surplus is higher.
Denote the change in total surplus ∆b by increasing eb to e′
b = e′
b + ǫ. If32
there are positive measures of (hp,hp) and (hp,hu) ﬁrms, it is given by:
∆p = ǫ[z(hp,hu) − z(ℓp,hu)] − ǫep − ǫ
2/2 and
∆u = ǫ[z(hp,hu) − z(hp,hp)/2] − ǫeu − ǫ
2/2,
reﬂecting the gains from turning an ℓp agent matched to an hu agent into
an hp agent matched to an hu agent, and from turning an ℓu agent matched
to an ℓu agent into an hu agent matched to an hp agent, who used to be
matched to an hp agent.
That is, assuming that indeed π > (1 − π)eu > π(1 − ep) the optimal
investments are given by ep = z(hp,hp)/2 and eu = z(hp,hu) − z(hp,hp)/2.
Recall that TU wages are given in this case by w(hp) = z(hp,hp)/2 = 1 and
w(ℓp) = z(hu,ℓp) − w(hu), and w(hu) = z(hp,hu) − z(hp,hp)/2 = 2δ − 1
and w(ℓu) = 0. Hence, TU investments are eT
p = z(hp,hu) − z(hu,ℓp) and
eT
u = z(hp,hu) − z(hp,hp)/2. That is, TU investments are optimal with
respect to marginal deviations.
Checking for larger deviations suppose only eu increases by ǫ, such that
the measure of (hu,hu) ﬁrms becomes positive after the increase. The change
in total surplus is now
∆ = ǫ1[z(hp,hu) − z(ℓp,hu)] + ǫ2[z(hu,hu)/2 − z(ℓu,ℓu)/2] − ǫep − ǫ
2/2,
for ǫ1 + ǫ2 = ǫ such that the measure of (hp,hp) under eu was ǫ1/2. Clearly,
∆ < 0 for eu = z(hp,hu) − z(ℓp,hu), since cost is convex and surplus has
decreasing returns in an eﬃcient matching. Suppose now that ep decreases by
ǫ large enough to have a positive measure of (ℓp,ℓp) ﬁrms after the decrease
(a decrease in eu would have the same eﬀect). The change in total surplus is
∆ = −ǫ1[z(hp,hu) − z(ℓp,hu)] − ǫ2[z(hp,hp)/2 − z(ℓp,ℓp)/2] + ǫep − ǫ
2/2,
which is negative for ep = z(hp,hu) − z(hu,ℓp) since cost is convex and
surplus has decreasing returns in an eﬃcient matching. Finally, an increase
of ep will not aﬀect the condition π > (1 − π)eu > π(1 − ep).
A similar argument holds for all ﬁve cases described in the proof of Fact
2.33
Proof of Fact 3
Since low achievers match with low achievers w(ℓp) = w(ℓu) = 0. High
achievers’ payoﬀs depend on relative scarcity, however.
Case 1: (1 − π)eu ≥ πep. Then hu agents outnumber hp agents and
w(hp) = δ. The expected payoﬀ of an hu agent is
Ew(hu) =
πep
(1 − π)eu
δ +
￿
1 −
πep
(1 − π)eu
￿
δ
2
.
Since ep = w(hp) − w(ℓp) = δw, and w(ℓu) = 0 this becomes a quadratic
equation in eu. It has a solution δ/2 ≤ eu ≤ δ if π ≤ 1/2, which is given by
eu =
δ
4
￿
1 +
r
1 + 8
π
1 − π
￿
.
Case 2: (1 − π)eu < πep. Then hp agents outnumber hu agents and
w(hu) = δ. The expected payoﬀ of an hp agent is
Ew(hu) =
(1 − π)eu
πep
δ +
￿
1 −
(1 − π)eu
πep
￿
.
Since eu = w(hu) − w(ℓu) = δ, and w(ℓp) = 0 this becomes a quadratic
equation in ep. It has a solution δ ≤ ep ≤ 1 if π ≥ 1/2, which is given by
ep =
1
2
 
1 +
r
1 − 4
1 − π
π
δ(1 − δ)
!
.
The last statement follows from comparing eB to the ﬁrst best and laissez-
faire levels.
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that e∗
p = 1 and e∗
u = δ/2. Given the expressions in the text, SA > S∗
if and only if
π
δ2 − 1
2
+ (1 − π)
δ2(1 +
p
1 + 8 π
1−π)2 − 4δ2
32
> 0 if π ≤ 1/2
π
(1 +
q
1 − 41−π
π δ(1 − δ))2 − 4
8
+ (1 − π)
3δ2
8
> 0 if π > 1/2.34
For π ≤ 1/2 calculations reveal that SA > S∗ if and only if δ > δ∗(π) with
δ
∗(π) =
2
3 − 1
4
1−π
π
￿p
1 + 8 π
1−π − 1
￿
Taking the derivative reveals that δ∗(π) increases in π on [0,1/2], with
δ∗(1/2) = 4/7 and δ∗(0) = 2/3. For π ≥ 1/2 δ∗ has to satisfy
1 − π
π
δ
∗(7δ
∗ − 4) = 2
 
1 +
r
1 − 4
1 − π
π
δ∗(1 − δ∗)
!
.
Solving numerically yields that there is a unique δ∗(π) in [2/3,1] for π ∈
[1/2,1]. It decreases in π, δ∗(1/2) = 2/
√
7, and δ∗(1) = 8/11.
Proof of Fact 4
Suppose ﬁrst that π ≥ 1/2. Then
w(hu) =
δ
2
(1 + ep) and w(ℓu) =
δ
2
ep.
Therefore eu = δ/2. p agents obtain a p match with probability (2π − 1)/π,
in which case the policy allows them to segregate in achievement. Hence,
w(hp) =
1 − π
π
δ
2
(1 + eu) +
2π − 1
π
and w(ℓp) =
1 − π
π
δ
2
eu.
Therefore
ep =
1 − π
π
δ
2
+
2π − 1
π
.
If π < 1/2 on the other hand,
w(hp) =
δ
2
(1 + eu) and w(ℓp) =
δ
2
eu.
Therefore ep = δ/2. u agents obtain a p match with probability π/(1 − π),
and otherwise the policy allows them to segregate in achievement. Hence,
w(hu) =
π
1 − π
δ
2
(1 + ep) +
1 − 2π
1 − π
δ
2
and w(ℓu) =
π
1 − π
δ
2
ep.
Then eu = δ/2, which holds since z(hu,ℓp) = z(hu,hu).35
Proof of Proposition 3
The case π ≤ 1/2 has been dealt with in the text. Suppose therefore π > 1/2.
Using the expression for eB
p total surplus under busing is
S
B =
3
8
(1 − π)δ
2 +
1
2
￿
1 − π
π
δ
2
+
2π − 1
π
￿￿
(1 − π)
3
2
δ + 2π − 1
￿
.
Since S∗ = π/2 + (1 − π)δ2/8, SB > S∗ if
δ >
2
3 − π
￿√
13π2 − 6π + 1 − 2(2π − 1)
￿
:= δ
B(π).
It is readily veriﬁed that δ∗(π) strictly decreases in π, δ∗(1/2) =
p
4/5 and
δ∗(1) = 2(
√
2 − 1).
Comparing total surplus under a busing policy to the one under an aﬃr-
mative action policy yields SA > SB if
3
8
(1 − π)δ
2 + π
(eB
p )2
2
+ (1 − π)
δ
2
e
B
p > (1 − π)
δ2
2
+ π
(eA
p )2
2
.
Using the expression for eB
p this becomes
1 − π
π
δ
8
((2 − 3π)δ + 4(2π − 1)) >
π
2
((e
A
p )
2 − (e
B
p )
2).
Solving numerically yields that the RHS exceeds the LHS for π > 1/2 and
δ > 2/3.
Proof of Fact 5
Going through the cases in the proof of Proposition 1 yields eT
p = θpδ if
π <
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu and eT
p = θp
￿
1 − δ + π
1−(1−δ)θp
(1−π)θu+πθp
￿
if
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu < π ≤
δθu
1−θp+δθu, and eT
p = θp otherwise.
eT
u = θuβ if π ≤
βθu
1+βθu, eT
u = θuπ
1−π if
βθu
1+βθu < π <
θu(2δ−1)
(2δ−1)θu+1−δθp, eT
u =
θu(2δ−1) if
θu(2δ−1)
(2δ−1)θu+1−δθp ≤ π ≤
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu, eT
u = π
1−(1−δ)θp
(1−π)θu+πθp if
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu <
π < δθu
1−θp+δθu, and eT
u = δθu otherwise.
For the ﬁrst condition, θp = e∗
p > e∗
u = θuβ. For the second, note ﬁrst
that (eT
p − eT
u) decreases in π, which can be veriﬁed using the expressions
above. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for eT
p > eT
u for any π ∈ [0,1] is given by
θp > δθu.36
Proof of Proposition 4
Since Lp > β − δ/2 (hu,ℓp) matches will form since z(hu,hu) + z(ℓp,ℓp) <
2z(hu,ℓp) and wages w(hu) > β are possible in an (hu,ℓp) ﬁrm. (hu,hp)
will not form since wages w(hp) > 1 are not possible in an (hu,hp) ﬁrm
since Lu < 1 − δ. Therefore hp and ℓu agents segregate, so that w(hp) = 1
and w(ℓu) = 0 in all cases. All possible (hu,ℓp) matches form, however, and
payoﬀs will depend on relative scarcity.
(i) (1−π)eu > π(1−ep), that is, hu agents are oversupplied and w(hu) = β
and w(ℓp) = δ−β. Therefore ep = θp(1+β−δ) < θpδ = eT
p and eu = θuβ = eT
u
if π <
θuβ
θuβ+1−θp(1−δ+β).
(ii) (1−π)eu < π(1−ep), that is, ℓp agents are oversupplied and w(hu) = δ
and w(ℓp) = 0. Therefore ep = θp = eT
p and eu = θuδ = eT
u if π > δθu/(δθu +
1 − θp).
(iii) (1 − π)eu = π(1 − ep), that is w(hu) = δ − w(ℓp) = eu/θu and
ep = θp(1 − w(ℓp)). This yields w(ℓp) =
(1−π)δθu−π(1−θp)
(1−π)θu+πθp , so that ep = eT
p and
eu = eT
u for π ≥
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu and ep < eT
p otherwise. Since eT
u = θu(2δ − 1)
for
(2δ−1)θu
(2δ−1)θu+(1−δθp) < π <
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu and eT
u > θuβ whenever π >
βθu
βθu+1 we
have that eu < eT
u if
βθu
βθu+1 < π <
1+θu−(1−δ)θp
1+(1+δ)θp−θu.
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